by Brian Bosse, Copyright June 24, 2009, all rights reserved. 917 views
The following paper I wrote a couple of years ago and will be soon revising.1 • wanttruth2 • March 03, 2010 • 12:07 PM
I’m a bit confused. Am I missing something here? When putting this paper together, you use “absolute certain” language. Isn’t this what the Presuppositional method is basically stating? I am typing this response to your article. Am I mistaken about this, or should I doubt the “absolute certainty” that this sentence is being typed by me? In a a non-christian worldview, one cannot provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility but this alone only proves that the non-christian worldview cannot account for intelligibility (or anything else for that matter), and does not prove the christian God. If God exists, and I believe He does, He says that we can know “absolutely”. Not only this but one must presuppose the God of the bible to know the “facts” truly, in principle, and not from the myth of autonomous reason. If we employ the tools of logic autonomously apart from presupposing the God of the bible, we are reduced to absurdity. What am I missing?
2 • A.V. • March 23, 2010 • 11:33 PM
“Much learning doth make thee mad”
Basically your contentions are taking advantage of our limitations as finite creatures. Referring to the certainty appealed to by Bahnsen (impossibility of the contrary) that it can never be claimed by anyone other than God (why not his word to men providing us with certainty?). You show the dilemma of human limitation stating that one can never know for certain because there may arise a world view in the future or somewhere else which could more accurately provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Only God himself can know exhaustively and universally if some other such worldview exists. Within the Christian framework God informs us that there is no wisdom against him and the fear of him is the beginning of knowledge. Based upon this, any future expectation of a superior worldview would be founded upon the bible which expressly denies such a possibility.
The other problem you raise is about Bahnsen stating our potential to misapply the laws of deduction in his debate with R.C. Sproul. In context I believe he was referring to the dilemma of using the laws of logic outside of the Christian framework in an attempt to provide certainty. The ability to properly reason is expected out of us by God (let us reason together- Isa.1:18). Within the Christian worldview a person can and better reason correctly and accurately.
On a moral note, how do you answer your apparent contention with the bible (Prov.21:30) that there is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the LORD? You appear to be taking up arms with God here. What grounds do you offer for the certainty you demand?
3 • Brian Bosse • March 24, 2010 • 1:54 AM
Hello wanttruth2,
You say that God says we can know absolutely (with absolute certainty). How do you know this, and is this known by you with absolute certainty? Is it possible that only God can know things with absolute certainty, and those who want to have some claim to absolute certainty are confusing the creator creature distinction?
Brian
4 • Brian Bosse • March 24, 2010 • 2:07 AM
Hello A.V.,
Thank you for reading my paper. You ask why God cannot reveal truth to us with absolute certainty through His word. Simply put, we must interpret His word, and we are fallible in our interpretation. Consider the diversity of interpretations even within the same traditions.
As for the misapplication of the laws of logic quote, Bahnsen was making a general statement about mankind’s inability to apply the laws of logic. Do you ever make mistakes in your reasoning?
Lastly, I am not sure how it is that I am taking up arms against God, and I am not making any demands for certainty.
Sincerely,
Brian - A CT Advocate 
5 • wanttruth2 • March 24, 2010 • 7:22 AM
Then why do you appeal to Modus Ponens or logic for that matter to make any claims to Van Til/Bahnsen being incorrect in their positions. Aren’t you yourself assuming a form of “absolute certainty”? To say that I might be confusing the Creator creature distinction is to assume that there is a Creator creature distinction to be made therefore you have assumed an “absolute certainty”. Since God created us in His image and passed on His characteristics such as communication, we can communicate. Communication itself is an “absolute” otherwise this conversation is not happening and you and I are not communicating.
6 • Shotgun • March 24, 2010 • 12:59 PM
Mr. Bosse,
For what it’s worth, I offer a few observations on this as well.
http://shotgunwildatheart.wordpress.com/2010/03/24/quick-thoughts-on-bosses-critique-of-tag/
7 • A.V. • March 24, 2010 • 3:55 PM
“You ask why God cannot reveal truth to us with absolute certainty through His word. Simply put, we must interpret His word, and we are fallible in our interpretation. Consider the diversity of interpretations even within the same traditions.”
Bahnsen also gave a list of verses demonstrating the assurance and certainty the scriptures offer in his debate with Sproul. How do you account for the certainty the bible guarentees?
Can God not communicate with us accurately and with certainty? How do you answer Prov. 21:30 which states that there is no wisdom nor counsel nor understanding against the LORD? Are you saying that because we cannot know as much as God knows that we cannot have certainty of the impossibility of knowledge or wisdom contrary to the Lord? If the bible declares such certainty is attainable within itself (thy testimonies are very sure- ps.93:5). And the more sure word of prophecy exceeds our hearing and seeing (2 Pt.1:16-19 kjv) then we can be fully persuaded as Abraham (Rom.4:20-1).
Basically you are standing upon the revelation of scripture and declaring that perhaps in the future someone may hear ot tell some new thing which provides preconditions for intelligibility better than scripture. All the while the scripture indicates that no such possiblity exists.
8 • Brian Bosse • March 25, 2010 • 1:46 AM
Hello wanttruth2,
You ask me if my appeal to Modus Ponens and other argument forms is an appeal to absolute certainty. It is not. I grant that any Modus Ponens arguments I might construct does not provide philosophical certainty. Also, I never claimed philosophical certainty for my argument against the strong modal form of TAG.
Lastly, I do not know what you mean by “communication is an absolute.” Are you saying that communcation is absolutely certain or provides absolute certainty? If so, my wife would strongly disagree with you. 
Brian
9 • Brian Bosse • March 25, 2010 • 1:47 AM
Hello Shotgun,
Thank you for linking to my article on your blog, and thank you for your comments.
Sincerely,
Brian
10 • Brian Bosse • March 25, 2010 • 2:08 AM
Hello AV,
You ask me how I would account for the certainty that the Bible guarantees. I have two points to make regarding this…
(1) Your establishment that the Bible does in fact guarantee this certainty requires some type of exegetical argument. This argument will not be philosophically certain.
(2) I am aware of those parts of Scripture that speak of having a full assurance. If this is what you are talking about, then you need to establish in a philosophically certain manner that this “full assurance” entails philosophical certainty.
I would make the same two points regarding Psalm 93:5 and 2 Peter. Whatever exegetical arguments you might present for philosophical certainty in these passages would not be philosophically certain.
Your last paragraph seems to indicate that you may not understand the argument I presented in my paper. I think TAG is a very good argument, and provides a strong rational basis for acceptance. I just do not think it provides philosophical certainty, and argued for why I did not think it provides philosophical certainty.
As a point of clarification, Scripture does not provide the preconditions for intelligibility; rather, it is God Himself. Scripture is simply a revelation of this God.
Sincerely,
Brian
11 • A.V. • March 25, 2010 • 7:35 AM
Brian,
Maybe you could elaborate on philosphical certainty verses biblical certainty in such a way that leaves the disputer of this world without excuse. You seem to be answering the question raised by Paul in 1 Cor.1:20 in the contrary and leaving them with an excuse (Rom.1:20). Again I would ask you to answer Prov. 21:30 which states that there is no wisdom nor counsel nor understanding against the LORD.
12 • Shotgun • March 25, 2010 • 4:24 PM
Mr. Bosse,
I know you’re busy and may not appreciate my observations and so I’ll state at the outset that if you don’t answer or don’t feel like taking the time to correct my misunderstandings, then I’m totally ok with that.
I just sincerely want to get to the bottom of this. I’m driven by my love for Christ.
In response to your 3 arguments:
(Argument 1): It seems like you’re equivocating between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. If Van Til or Bahnsen ever claimed their arguments could attain God’s level of knowledge about a fact, that would, certainly(!) be a mistake. But they claimed otherwise many times and this lead them to posit paradox…which got them in trouble elsewhere.
(Argument 2): Haven’t systematic theologians constructed positive statements of Christianity (deduced from Biblical data) that present a coherent and consistent conceptual scheme?
(Argument 3): I thought of an analogy that seems to be appropriate:
No matter which path through the woods a person takes, it is necessarily true that none of them will lead from my beroom to my kitchen.
We don’t have to demonstrate this over and over by constantly following each of an infinite number of paths. None of them are in my house!
Thanks for any time you give…I love your website, (that dog is something else!)
13 • Brian Bosse • March 26, 2010 • 12:16 AM
Hello AV,
I do not think it is true that man is culpable concerning ‘X’ if and only if man knows ‘X’ with philosophical certainty. In other words, I think man can be culpable concerning ‘X’ even if he does not have philosophical certainty regarding ‘X’. (Frankly, I can’t imagine too many people disagreeing with me on this point.) As such, my arguing that TAG does not provide a philosophically certain argument for the existence of God in no way mitigates the disputer’s guilt for failing to honor God as God.
Brian
14 • Brian Bosse • March 26, 2010 • 12:34 AM
Hello Shotgun,
(1) It is my position that only God can have philosophical certainty because this level of certainty requires both omniscience and infallibility. (This was not the point of my paper - nor do I believe did I make this claim in my paper.) Nevertheless, it was Bahnsen who made such high claims regarding TAG. I merely argued for why the TAG does not live up to Bahnsen’s claims.
(2) Yes.
(3) I am not sure what your point is here. I think you are trying to make a point about the inductive nature of Bahnsen’s formulation of TAG. Bahnsen makes assertions about the failure of all non-believing worldviews that are nothing more than assertions. In practice (and as explicated by him in several books), he simply takes down the worldview that is before him, and whatever worldviews are presented next. This is what *he* does when *he* is doing TAG. This is an inductive process, and as such loses philosophical certainty. If he really had a deductively certain argument, then he would not need to go through his two-step process (show how Christianity meets some precondition of intelligibility, and show how the competing worldview does not). All he would have to do is present the deductive argument and there would be nothing left to say. Once Pythagoras presented his famous geometric proof there was nothing left to be said regarding the matter!
Thank you for your kind words about the site. You made my day!
Brian
15 • A.V. • March 26, 2010 • 9:06 AM
Brian,
Thanks for spending your time clarifying these things. I agree with you here: “I do not think it is true that man is culpable concerning ‘X’ if and only if man knows ‘X’ with philosophical certainty.” It appears that you mean ‘God’s knowledge’ by philosophical certainty. I would ask you again though- is there knowledge wisdom or understanding against the LORD?
So would you say also that since TAG doesn’t provide the impossibility of the contrary that it allows for the possibility of the contrary? Would the bible agree with this?
Also could you develop this statement more fully:
“my arguing that TAG does not provide a philosophically certain argument for the existence of God in no way mitigates the disputer’s guilt for failing to honor God as God.” Why not, in other words, if you allow for the possibility of the contrary?
With eternal hell in the balance what kind of certainty is attainable to humans?
Also regarding your response to Shotgun “If he really had a deductively certain argument, then he would not need to go through his two-step process (show how Christianity meets some precondition of intelligibility, and show how the competing worldview does not). All he would have to do is present the deductive argument and there would be nothing left to say. Once Pythagoras presented his famous geometric proof there was nothing left to be said regarding the matter!” This seems to equivocate between reasoning within a worldview like Pythagoras to reasoning by a world view like TAG requires.
Sorry for all the questions just trying to apply what you are saying.
Thanks again,
AV
16 • A.V. • March 26, 2010 • 9:12 AM
Open Question:
If TAG presupposes scripture how can someone adhereing to TAG also believe in textual criticism? In other words if you presuppose the bible how do you then exercise yourself in empiricism trying to determine what the scripture actually is?
17 • Shotgun • March 26, 2010 • 11:09 AM
lol…thanks for the response Mr. Bosse,
As for Pythagoras…I don’t suppose he has read your 1st argument in this article? :D
I’ll try and work on my analogy (in ref. to argument 3) to see if I can clarify it and work it out(keeping your criticism in mind.)
18 • Brian Bosse • March 26, 2010 • 5:22 PM
Hello AV,
So would you say also that since TAG doesn’t provide the impossibility of the contrary that it allows for the possibility of the contrary?
TAG is special type of argument for the existence of God. It argues that God is the precondition for those things necessary for human experience. Since we cannot rationally deny those things of human experience, then to be rational we cannot deny God. In other words, the contrary, i.e., God’s non-existence, is impossible. It is in this since that TAG presents an argument for the impossibility of the contrary. In other words, TAG is an “impossibility of the contrary” type argument.
With that said, my critique has to do with the claim that TAG, as presented by Bahnsen and others, is a deductively certain argument – not whether or not it is properly called an “impossibility of the contrary” type argument. I argue in my paper that there is an explicit inductive element involved that causes this “impossibility of the contrary” argument to lose its logical necessity. It is still properly an “impossibility of the contrary” type argument, but it is an argument whose conclusion is established utilizing an inductive element. As such, TAG is an argument whose conclusion has not been established with deductive certainty.
With eternal hell in the balance what kind of certainty is attainable to humans?
Humans can have very high levels of certainty. We just cannot have the kind of certainty that God has, which is what philosophical certainty is. Yet, arguments whose conclusions have been established inductively can provide very high levels of rational justification for their conclusions. So much so, that we “ought” to accept their conclusions. I believe TAG is one such argument. Even though it has an inductive element, to deny its conclusion on this basis is not rationally justified. So, the disputer is not let off the hook.
This seems to equivocate between reasoning within a worldview like Pythagoras to reasoning by a world view like TAG requires.
This really goes with the first answer I gave above. The point I was making about Pythagoras’ Theorem was that it an argument established in a deductively certain manner. TAG does not establish the necessity of God in a deductively certain manner. This is not a comment about the necessity of God; rather, it is a comment about the nature of the TAG argument itself. The way TAG is practiced by Van Til and Bahnsen using the two-step process demonstrates that they do not have a deductively certain argument. Their claims of certainty are contradicted by their practice.
With all of this said, please do not think that I do not appreciate Bahnsen, Van Til or TAG. I respect them very highly, and I use some form of TAG in many of my apologetic encounters. I just think Bahnsen and Van Til thought too highly of their argument and wrongly criticized other apologetic methods that were more inductive in nature.
Sincerely,
Brian
19 • Brian Bosse • March 26, 2010 • 6:55 PM
Hello AV,
Regarding your open question, you asked, “If TAG presupposes scripture how can someone adhering to TAG also believe in textual criticism?”
For me, textual critical issues do not undermine TAG because I do not claim to have an absolute certain argument. My argument provides rational justification for the hope that is in me, and gives reasons for why someone should believe. Now, those that claim absolute certainty for their argument could not appeal to a physical book that is itself not absolutely certain in its text. But this is not required by TAG, and absolute certainty is a chimera.
(Note: there is looming in the background here a rather important distinction between the words of a book and the ideas they express. Textual criticism is concerned with the former. The later is an abstract immaterial entity, and is something that we try to accurately express with our words on a page. There is a sense in which Scripture is not made up of the words on the page per se, but rather is made up of those ideas expressed by the words on a page. )
Sincerely,
Brian
P.S. Interestingly, Greg Bahnsen accepted textual criticism.
20 • A.V. • March 26, 2010 • 10:03 PM
It seems inconsistent to believe TAG and also the ‘science’ of textual criticism. How can you presuppose the truth of the bible and then criticize it using science? If your science depends on the bible you cannot then turn it onthe bible as judge.
21 • Brian Bosse • March 27, 2010 • 11:15 AM
Hello AV,
Are you saying that if there are any textual critical issues with the Bible whatsoever, then it cannot be an authority for truth in our lives? If so, then I agree TAG would fail because it would no longer be able to appeal to Scripture to establish its key premises. However, I do not accept the idea that textual critical issues negate the Bible’s authority. In fact, Greg Bahnsen argues this point in his essay, “The Inerrancy of the Autographa.”
Brian
22 • Shotgun • March 28, 2010 • 7:24 PM
Here is a quote that may help Mr. AV clear up what the transcendental philosopher is trying to accomplish:
But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. - Kant in the introduction to the 2nd ed. of Critique of Pure Reason
You have to clearly distinguish “HOW” we know something from “why” we know it. In this case…we discover the Bible via empirical experience, but we can only do so because what we experience in the text is true.
To Mr. Brian,
Thanks again for the comments. In addition to Bahnsen’s work on Inerrancy, Van Til has a famous essay in the beginning of Warfield’s book on the Inspiration and Authority of the Bible.
23 • A.V. • March 28, 2010 • 10:54 PM
Brian,
I have read Bahnsen’s essay and he makes some good points, but it seems to be double minded. Because textual criticism undermines TAG. If the bible is presupposed you cannot then question portions of it without calling all of it into question. You would have to suspend your faith in the presupposed bible, grab science and use it to reconfirm your faith in the bible.
The only way to avoid this dilemma is to revert back to the confessions:
“our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.” (1689 Baptist Confession)
http://www.vor.org/truth/1689/1689bc01.html
“The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, and obeyed, depends not upon the testimony of any man, or Church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God.”
(Westminster confession 1646)
http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/
Apparently they knew what the scriptures were without the ‘science’ of textual criticism.
24 • Brian Bosse • March 28, 2010 • 11:09 PM
Hello Shotgun,
Thank you for pointing to Warfield’s book. I own the book, but have not yet read it. I just opened my addition (1948) and see that Van Til’s introduction is sixty-five pages long! I will take time to read this. Warfield did study for a time in Europe with the German textual critics. C. W. Hodge asked Warfield to partner with him in writing a defense of verbal inspiration in light of the pressure coming from these German critics. Theodore Letis, in his The Ecclesiastical Text, argues that as a result of this work Warfield paved the way for higher criticism in mainline Protestantism, which was a departing from the dogmaticians of older times.
Being that Bahnsen’s work at Westminster focused on Warefield, it is not surprising that Bahnsen accepts the need and validity of textual critical practice.
Sincerely,
Brian
P.S. Letis was no sloutch when it came to textual criticism. He used what he called a canonical approach to textual criticism - an approach that might interest A.V..
25 • Mitch Cervinka • July 01, 2010 • 10:31 PM
Hi Brian,
I appreciated reading your insightful critque of Van Til’s apologetic method.
You made one point that I wanted to discuss with you… “... even if it was granted that the apologist succeeded in (1), he still fails to establish in an objectively certain manner the key proposition of the RAA proof. All that happens in (2) above is that the apologist takes down one worldview at a time. He never demonstrates that there are no other worldviews that meet the necessary preconditions for knowledge. He only shows that the one he is looking at, and perhaps all of the ones he is aware of, cannot provide the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. One is only left with the truth of the claim based on the worldviews so far analyzed. It is from this basis that the apologist inductively concludes that all worldviews outside Christianity fail!”
The presuppositionalists that I have read (some of them, at least) would not agree that one merely “takes down one worldview at a time”. Instead, I think their point is that any valid theory of knowledge must begin with starting assumptions that are 1) self-justifying, and 2) rich enough to produce a comprehensive worldview. Unless you begin with the sovereign, eternal, infinite, all-knowing, unchanging God, as the Bible describes, you can never give a final answer to the question “How do you know?” or “How can you be sure?” Without an absolute basis (i.e. the eternal, infinite God), any answer you give will prompt a re-asking of the question, and the debate could continue forever without ever arriving at knowledge that is known with certainty. In other words, apart from an infinite God, the question “How do you know?” will result in an infinite regress of one unjustified claim after another, or, more likely, will appeal to an earlier claim, resulting in a circular argument.
Vincent Cheung sums it up well in chapter 1 of his book “Systematic Theology” [http://www.vincentcheung.com/books/theology2010.pdf] ...
—-
Deduction is the only valid form of reasoning. It proceeds from premises to conclusions by logical necessity. However, since deductive reasoning never produces information that is not already implicit in the premises, the first principle of a deductive system must contain all the information for the rest of the system. This means that a first principle that is too narrow will fail to provide a sufficient number of propositions to produce a comprehensive and coherent worldview, or a system of thought that is able to answer all necessary questions. Thus knowledge is impossible on the basis of induction, empiricism, or any inadequate first principle.
Even if a first principle appears to be sufficiently broad and contains enough information to construct a worldview, there must be justification for it, or some reason for affirming it over another. The justification for a first principle cannot come from a higher authority or a prior premise, for then it would not be the first principle. A lower authority or premise within the system cannot justify the first principle, since it is on this very first principle that this lower authority or premise depends. Therefore, a first principle of a system of thought must be self-authenticating – it must stand on its own authority.
The Bible is the ultimate authority of the Christian system; therefore, our first principle, our starting point, or the foundation of our thinking, is the Bible itself. This may be expressed by any proposition that represents all the contents of the Bible, such as “The Bible is truth” or “The Bible is the word of God.”
Although empirical, inductive, and scientific arguments have been formulated in support of biblical revelation, and although they seem to be forceful given empirical assumptions, so that no empirically inclined non-Christian can refute them, the Christian must regard these arguments as unreliable because – as I have extensively argued elsewhere – all empirical, inductive, and scientific methods are irrational and prevent the discovery of truth. Moreover, if we were to depend on empirical arguments and procedures to justify the Bible, the empirical assumptions would then stand as judge over the very word of God, so that Scripture would no longer be the ultimate authority in our system. As Hebrews 6:13 says, “When God made his promise to Abraham, since there was no one greater for him to swear by, he swore by himself.” Since God possesses ultimate authority, there is no higher authority by which one may pronounce the Bible as infallible
and inerrant.
—-
26 • Brian Bosse • July 02, 2010 • 2:03 AM
Hello Mitch,
Thank you for reading the paper.
I agree that TAG seeks to prove that unless one starts with Christian God one lacks the metaphysical foundation needed to account for knowledge. My paper argues that the proof of this ultimately rests on an inductive element thereby losing its deductive necessity. As such, when TAG propponents criticize other apologetic methods for their lack of certainty, TAG propponets are simply the pot calling the kettle black. At least, that is what I argued for.
Sincerely,
Brian
27 • Mitch Cervinka • July 02, 2010 • 5:09 PM
Thank you, Brian, for the explanation.
I guess my point is that I’m not convinced that there is an inductive element involved. The deductive claim is simply this: knowledge cannot exist without an absolute foundation for knowledge, and this requires an infinite, unchanging source of knowledge—complete with faculties of reason, morality and personality.
Any given philosophy X either possesses this foundation or it does not, which is a deductive statement, not an inductive one.
In order to demonstrate to one who holds such a philosophy that his philosophy lacks the necessary metaphysical foundation, we may need to customize the argument to his way of thinking, or to give specific examples of where his philosophy is inconsistent. This may have the appearance of an inductive argument, but really has to do with the form, rather than the substance of the argument.
I believe scripture gives illuminating examples of the presupposition approach and its basis for certainty: Abraham was certain that God had spoken to him—certain enough that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac. Shadrach, Meschach and Abed-Nego were certain enough to enter the fiery furnace. What was the basis of their certainty?
The Bible does not begin with proofs of the existence of God, but rather assumes the existence of God and proceeds from this assumption. “In the beginning God created ...”. In other words, God is viewed as the foundation of all knowledge—the eternal, essential reality that explains and justifies any other reality.
The Bible does not admit the possibility of an “innocent ignorance” of God’s existence. (See Romans 1:19-20; Psalm 14:1-3). The knowledge of God is programmed into our thinking, just as logic and morality are. Men can sinfully attempt to deny the God they know exists, just as they attempt to deny the necessity of logic, or the necessity of morality, but by the very process of denying these realities, they prove them to be true, since they must appeal to logic and morality in order to make their case.
Thus, if we would think “Christianly” or “Biblically”, should we not follow the example of beginning with the assumption of God, rather than attempting to prove His existence based on other “facts” which ultimately cannot themselves be proven apart from the assumption of God?
I think these considerations are central to the presuppositional method. We need to “think God’s thoughts after Him”, and the example He gives is that we must acknowledge His existence and preeminence in order to think correctly.
This way of thinking, if applied consistently, leads to the confidence and certainty that can support the faith/obedience of one like Abraham or the three Jewish youths.
28 • Brian Bosse • July 02, 2010 • 7:18 PM
Hello Mitch,
You speak of the ‘deductive claim.’ Arguments can be called ‘deductive,’ but it really is not proper to speak of claims in this manner. Claims, in and of themselves, are propositions. Propositions are either asserted or justified. Justification can take many forms – one of which is some type of deductive argument whose conclusion is the proposition being justified. So, a claim can be justified deductively, inductively, or some other way (like abduction). Let’s look at two of your claims from your last post.
(1) Knowledge cannot exist without an absolute foundation for knowledge.
(2) An absolute foundation for knowledge requires an infinite, unchanging source of knowledge complete with faculties of reason, morality and personality.
Here are three additional claims that must be made to establish the existence of the Christian God…
(3) The Christian God provides the infinite, unchanging source of knowledge complete with faculties of reason, morality and personality.
(4) It is impossible for there to be any other worldview that provides an infinite, unchanging source of knowledge complete with faculties of reason, morality and personality.
(5) Knowledge exists.
Mitch, I grant that the five assertions above lead to the conclusion that the Christian God exists. However, for this to be a philosophically certain argument all five of the assertions much be established in a philosophically certain way. Let’s grant for the moment (3) and (5). Can you establish (1), (2) and (4) in a philosophically certain way? Do you have a full blown theory of knowledge that is itself philosophically certain justifying (1) and (2)? Can you prove (4), which is the “impossibility of the contrary” claim? TAG simply fails at each of these very points.
Sincerely,
Brian
29 • Mitch Cervinka • July 03, 2010 • 4:11 PM
Hi Brian,
Thank you for correcting my abuse of terms.
I will repeat assertion (4) for reference ...
(4) It is impossible for there to be any
other worldview that provides an infinite,
unchanging source of knowledge complete with
faculties of reason, morality and personality.
This assertion (concerning alternative worldviews) is not necessary to TAG (the Transcendental Argument for God) since TAG is an argument for God, and not for the entire corpus of Biblical revelation. Any other worldview that affirms the same qualities for God necessary for knowledge and rational thought is therefore making the same claim for the existence of God, and thus is not a departure from TAG. Such an argument does not justify the entire worldview, but it does prove the existence of an infinite, eternal, rational, personal, moral and transcendent God.
We can, of course, justify why the Biblical worldview is the correct one, in contrast to any of its known or hypothetical competitors, but this could entail more than a transcendental argument, since it would take into consideration the Bible’s antiquity, its faithful preservation, and its wide acceptance by Christians through many centuries and cultures—features which a new or novel philosophy could not credibly claim.
Here are the other two assertions you called into question ...
(1) Knowledge cannot exist without an absolute
foundation for knowledge.
(2) An absolute foundation for knowledge requires
an infinite, unchanging source of knowledge
complete with faculties of reason, morality and
personality.
Assertions (1) and (2) are justified by the considerations given by the excerpt from Vincent Cheung in my original post.
In capsule form,
1. All genuine knowledge is deductive by nature.
2. Deduction cannot produce conclusions that are
not implicit in the premises.
3. In order for any assertion to be established, it must
either justify itself, or be deducible from a
premise that justifies itself.
4. At the bottom of one’s worldview are axioms that
must be a) sufficient to derive all essential truths
of the worldview, and b) self-justifying (i.e.
not inconsistent and able to account for their own
truth or validity).
The necessity of a set of self-justifying axioms is what necessitates a transcendent God. In particular, God’s aseity (self-sufficiency, non-dependence on anything else) ends the infinite regress of dependent causes. His rationality and personality explain why deduction and knowledge are valid concepts. His morality explains why we can and should regard some assertions as “true”, “right” or “good”, while others are “false”, “wrong” or “evil”.
If a worldview does not posit a transcendent God who possesses aseity, rationality, personality and morality, it is left perpetually groping for a more basic premise to justify any given premise, and thus ends in an infinite regress that can never support the entire system. It is the infinity, eternity and self-sufficiency of God that provides a solid foundation and ends the regress. Any lesser explanation is necessarily inadequate, and a greater explanation is logically impossible (nothing is greater than infinity).
A further observation regarding the notion of “self-justifying”:
The statement “All Scripture is God-breathed” results in the following circularity: “God exists because the Bible says so.” and “The Bible is true because it is the Word of God.” However, while this circularity does not prove either of the two assertions, neither does it disprove them. The circularity demonstrates a consistency in its teaching—a consistency we would expect if God really does exist, and the Bible really is God’s Word.
If the Bible claimed not to be God’s Word, or if it claimed that God does not exist, then that would consistute an inconsistency that would discredit the Bible and prove it to not be God’s inerrant Word.
If the Bible did not claim to be God’s Word (but didn’t deny it either), then it might fail to be self-justifying, but this would not constitute it as being inconsistent or contradictory.
By accepting the assertion “The Bible is true” as an axiom, we automatically adopt the self-justifying assertions that a) God exists, and b) the Bible is God’s Word, which are not only consistent with the initial assertion (“The Bible is true”), but also explain why it is true. This obviously does not prove that the axiom itself is true, but it shows that it does explain, within the confines of the axiomatic system, why it should be true. Not all conceivable axiom sets would justify themselves in this way.
30 • Brian Bosse • July 04, 2010 • 12:49 AM
Hello Mitch,
You take issue with the claim in my paper that there is an inductive element involved in TAG. You also think that the assertion, “It is impossible for there to be any other worldview that provides an infinite, unchanging source of knowledge complete with faculties of reason, morality and personality,” is not a necessary element of TAG. In your study of TAG have you ever heard the phrase “the impossibility of the contrary”? This is essentially the claim that the triune God of Christianity is the necessary foundation for knowledge (see premise 1 below). It is this claim that allows the apologist to conclude that God exists. Apart from this, TAG loses all deductive necessity. Here is an austere formulation TAG…
Premise 1: If God does not exist, then there is no knowledge.
Premise 2: There is knowledge.
Conclusion: God exists.
This argument is the essence of TAG, and it is a valid deductive argument. The argument form is called Modus Tollens. Now, for this to be considered an objective certain proof for God both premises must be established in an objective manner. For the sake of the discussion let’s grant premise 2. So, the TAG apologist needs to only establish premise 1. My paper argues that TAG apologist establishes this premise with an argument that involves an inductive element. With that said, you claim that TAG does not need to rule out all possible worldviews to establish the truth of premise 1. I disagree. I provided explicit evidence in my paper. It would help me for you to show in my paper where my analysis went wrong. Now, some further comments…
You claim that “all genuine knowledge is deductive by nature”. How do you know this? If you are consistent, then for you to know this claim, it must have been established deductively. Can you give me your deductive argument whose conclusion is “all genuine knowledge is deductive by nature”?
Lastly, you will lose me in this conversation unless we can shorten up our posts. Can you try and limit your posts to one or two main points at the most? I promise that I will stay with you long enough for you to get everything you want to say out. But I do not have the time or desire to deal with more than one or two paragraphs at a time. Is that fair?
Thanks,
Brian
P.S. You sound a little like a Clarkian Scripturalist. Is that the case?
31 • Mitch Cervinka • July 06, 2010 • 1:54 PM
Hi Brian,
I apologize if my responses have been too lengthy. I’ll try to keep them short <:)
I have to concede that I’m probably over my head at this point. I have no formal training in apologetics although I have had some training in logic and have done a moderate amount of reading/listening/viewing of some of the more accessible works (Bahnsen-Stein debate, Ken Ham, Jason Lisle, R.C. Sproul, Richard Pratt, Norm Geisler, Ravi Zacharias, Doug Wilson and Vincent Cheung [who probably has some Clarkian leanings]).
Mr. Cheung asserts that “Deduction is the only valid form of reasoning,” arguing that “Induction is a formal
fallacy, since due to the form or structure of the reasoning process, the conclusion is
never a logically necessary result of the premises. The fallacy occurs when one reasons
from particulars to universals.”
Much more could be said, but I’m clearly not the best qualified person to say it.
One question: Could you explain the differences between the approach of Gordon Clark vs. Cornelius Van Til? I have not found a good summary of their views.
32 • Brian Bosse • July 06, 2010 • 5:19 PM
Hello Mitch,
Shorter is going to be better for me. So, thanks!
An inductive argument does not establish its conclusion in a necessary way. In other words, no matter how strong an inductive argument is its conclusion could be false; whereas, with a deductive argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion necessarily follows. But this is not an argument against induction. It is simply an observation on their different natures.
In broad general strokes, the difference between the apologetic approaches between Van Til and Clark are as follows…
Van Tillian Presuppositionalism
Premise 1: If God does not exist then, knowledge is not possible.
Premise 2: It is not the case that knowledge is not possible.
Conclusion: God exists.
Here, the apologist establishes premise 1 by arguing that the Christian worldview provides all the necessary preconditions for knowledge; whereas, the competing worldview fails to do so. As such, if we agree that there is knowledge (premise 2), then the Christian worldview must be true, and therefore God exists.
Clarkian Presuppositionalism (An Axiomatic Approach)
Clark argues that no construction in philosophy is possible without some sort of presupposition or a priori equipment. Therefore, secular philosophy that is based on the a posterori (like Aristotelianism) fail. Those secular philosophers based on the a priori (like Platonism) fail to select the right presuppositions to solve their problems. As such, all of secular philosophy has failed.
Clark proposes the hypothesis that, “The Bible alone is God’s Word,” be the presupposition we accept in light of the failures of all other attempted constructions. From this, he argues that by necessary inference one can come to all kinds of knowledge – including an establishment of the laws of logic and the truths of Scripture. Ultimately, we can account for the world around us. In other words, this system solves the problems that other systems failed in. Therefore, one ought to accept this particular system.
Personal Conclusions
I think both arguments have their good and bad points. Van Til’s approach, the approach I favor, is a strong argument as long as one does not claim more for it than what it really gives. It is an argument that provides strong rational justification for the existence of the Christian God. However, it is not deductively certain.
The Clarkian approach explicitly acknowledges the presuppositional nature of all philosophical systems, and tries to provide a foundation that within its own structure provides knowledge. I find this appealing. The problem is that the single axiom, “The Bible alone is God’s word,” is not sufficient to get things started. Something else must be presupposed before any deductive conclusions can result. So, ultimately Scripturalism, as it stands, fails to provide a basis for knowledge.
Does that help?
Brian
33 • Mitch Cervinka • July 07, 2010 • 1:22 PM
Thanks, Brian. I wish all discussions of apologetic methods were as concise as this. That’s really clear!
One more question:
You state “The problem (with the Clarkian approach) is that the single axiom ‘The Bible alone is God’s word,’ is not sufficient to get things started.”
Cheung sometimes appeals to “occasionalism”. What does this term mean, and does it solve the problem you mentioned?
34 • Mitch Cervinka • July 07, 2010 • 4:31 PM
Brian,
One more question: Why isn’t “The Bible alone is God’s word” sufficient to get things started in the Clarkian approach?
Assuming that both parties accept the preconditions of intelligibility (which they must anyway, in order to carry on a philosophical discussion), it seems to me that the only other issues that might pose a problem have to do with canonicity, preservation or hermeneutics. In other words, what do we mean by “the Bible”?
Are there other considerations as well?
35 • Brian Bosse • July 08, 2010 • 1:40 AM
Hello Mitch,
I am happy you are finding my explanations clear; although, this does not necessarily mean that my judgments are right. I am not sure what Cheung means by his use of the term ‘occasionalism’; so, I am not going to be much help there.
You asked about the problem with Clark’s axiomatic method. Certainly, the issues you raised are issues that when pressed undermine Scripturalism. Clark refers to his system as an axiomatic system. The idea behind an axiomatic system is that one starts with a set of axioms, and by necessary inference proves further statements from this set of axioms called theorems. (It should be noted that the deductive apparatus itself is defined within the system.) Euclidean Geometry and propositional calculus are two such axiomatic systems. (By the way, mathematical logic is the field that studies such systems. It is an interest of mine. I have another blog that I just started related to this topic: http://godelsproof.wordpress.com)
Well, this is what Clark has in mind. He wants to say that the axiom and anything that follows from the axiom deductively is knowledge. Nothing else is properly called knowledge. The problem is that the axiom, “The Bible is the word of God,” cannot lead to any truth without more information. For example, how does one go deductively from “The Bible is the word of God” to “The Bible is true”? Well, here is one possible argument…
Premise 1: All the word of God is true.
Premise 2: The Bible is the word of God.
Conclusion: The Bible is true.
Now, this is a good deductive argument. The problem for the Scripturalist is that premise 1 is not an axiom of the system, and it is not an immediate consequence of the axiom. So, where did it come from? Also, how do we know that this is a good deductive argument? (Clark does not define his deductive apparatus apart from the axiom. He wants to say that the deductive apparatus is established by the axiom in that Scripture presupposes the laws of logic. But how does he even know this?) Now, this is only the tip of the iceberg for the Scripturalist problems. For example, how do we know what the Bible says? Where does our understanding of the Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic languages come from? What about the rules of proper hermeneutics we use to understand what is written? If all these things are not knowledge but are necessary components in determining what is taught by the Bible, then whatever conclusions we come to from the one axiom cannot be properly called knowledge. There are myriads of issues like this. In the end, I am convinced that Clark’s Scripturalism cannot give any knowledge whatsoever. One cannot even know what is meant by the axiom itself! Whatever grammatical and lexical information used to understand the axiom itself must have come from the axiom to be real knowledge.
Sincerely,
Brian
36 • Mitch Cervinka • July 08, 2010 • 12:56 PM
Brian,
Could we not grant Clark the preconditions of intelligibility as part of his set of axioms? Wouldn’t this eliminate many of the problems you cited?
Also, isn’t the Van Tillian approach more than just an argument for the existence of God? Doesn’t it claim to establish the entire Christian worldview?
By the way, I have a Master’s degree in Mathematics and took a class in mathematic logic, which was very interesting. The majority of courses in graduate level math investigate axiomatic systems: algebra, geometry, topology, set theory, etc., through the use of deductive theorems.
37 • Brian Bosse • July 09, 2010 • 2:01 AM
Hello Mitch,
You and I may share similar interests. I enjoy reading the Puritans; I enjoy studying theology; I enjoy philosophy; I enjoy mathematics and logic. My mathematics training is self-taught; so, I bow to your expertise. My personal library contains a number of graduate texts in set theory, mathematical logic and number theory. Are you doing anything with your mathematics degree?
As far as Clark goes, making all the necessary preconditions for intelligibility part of his set of axioms seems to me to grant too much. (I think he thought so, too, and as such did not do this.) All philosophers want to be able to criticize competing philosophies for failing to provide the grounds for intelligibility. If a system could simply posit these preconditions as axioms, then, assuming the axioms are consistent, there is no basis for criticism. They are justified on the basis of simply being axioms.
Secondly, making all the necessary preconditions for intelligibility part of the set of axioms undermines one of the key purposes of Scripturalism. How does one know what the preconditions for knowledge are? It would seem to me that one would have to work out a complete system of knowledge first so as to posit its necessary components as axioms. But attempting to work such a system out is precisely the burden for all philosophical systems, and is what Clark is trying to do with his Scripturalism. So, by making these preconditions as axioms you remove all motivation for what Clark is trying to do with his Scripturalism right up front.
Thirdly, regarding Clark’s motivation, making the preconditions as axioms is tantamount to denying the main position of Scripturalism, “All knowledge is that which is derived from Scripture.” With this, Pandora’s Box has been opened – a box Clark does not want to open up. It is a box where much is flying out – some of which may undermine the very criticisms Clark has leveled against other systems.
For me, I do not mind opening up the box. I do not think all knowledge is that which is derived from Scripture. Now, this may create some difficulties in the minds of the Scripturalists, but this is where the Christian philosopher needs to roll up his sleeve and get to work.
As far as the Van Til argument goes, you are correct. The propositions “God exists,” “the Christian worldview is correct,” and “the Bible is true,” are all tied together. The apologist appeals to the propositions contained in the Bible when he accounts for knowledge – part of this appeal is the ontological necessity for the Christian God. Also, the Bible is the source which defines the Christian worldview. So, these three all stand together or all fall together.
Warm Regards,
Brian
38 • Mitch Cervinka • July 09, 2010 • 11:34 AM
Aha! I thought I detected a “kindred spirit” here (as Anne—with an “e”—was fond of saying).
I am currently working as a software developer on engineering applications. This exercises some of my mathematical background (geometry, numerical algorithms, simple logic). In addition, I like to occasionally read web articles on math-related subjects to expand or refresh my skill set.
It seems to me that one could salvage the Clarkian approach by simply adopting the postulate P1:“The Bible is true” rather than “The Bible is God’s Word”.
Inherent within the postulate are the following assumptions (i.e. implied postulates):
P2: Truth exists.
P3: Language conveys fixed meaning.
P4: “The Bible” is a well-defined concept.
P5: The Bible is understandable.
From this base, one should be able to conclude:
T1: All the Bible is God’s Word (2 Tim 3:16)
T2: God cannot lie (Heb 6:18)
which then justifies P1 (i.e. “the Bible is true”), and also affirms Clark’s original postulate “The Bible is God’s Word”.
Would this be a workable approach?
39 • Brian Bosse • July 09, 2010 • 5:15 PM
Hello Mitch,
Let’s grant P1-P5. Go from this to T2 without adding any other assumptions. I think you will immediately see that this is not workable.
Now, according to Scripturalism, proposition X is knowledge if and only if X follows deductively from the one axiom. This is where they go wrong. Not only is it a presupposition not derived from the one axiom, but it means necessary propositions like your P2-P5 cannot be knowledge. And since propositions like P2-P5 are necessary (but not sufficient as you have already seen!) to derive anything from Scripture, and since they are not knowledge themselves, then what follows cannot be properly called knowledge. That is why I think Scripturalism undermines knowledge altogether.
Brian
40 • Mitch Cervinka • July 09, 2010 • 7:00 PM
I don’t see the problem with going from P1 “The Bible is true” to T2 “God cannot lie”, since the Bible, in Heb 6:18, says that “it is impossible for God to lie”.
Consider the following proof (“A”=assertion)...
A1: Hebrews 6:18 says “it is impossible for God to lie”
A2: Hebrews 6:18 is part of the Bible (by P4)
A3: Hence, the Bible says “it is impossible for God to lie” (A1+A2)
A4: Therefore, it is true that God cannot lie. (P1+A3).
I’m not sure where you see a problem with this.
I think calling P2-P5 “necessary propositions” may be somewhat misleading. I am not appealing to the “preconditions of intelligibility” in some general sense (although I certainly think the concept is valid and useful).
P1 is unintelligible without defining terms like “Bible” and “true”, so, to assert “The Bible is true”, specific meanings must be assigned to the terms. These are implicit in the assertion itself, but can be made explicit by positing the additional axioms.
P1 is thus an informal “summary” of P1-P5. To be formal and complete, we would explicitly list all five (and perhaps more) that are inherently being asserted when we say “The Bible is true.”
For these reasons, I think it is naive to think that a single proposition can stand alone, without meanings and definitions being agreed upon beforehand, or else being defined and asserted along with the original proposition.
Note: Even simple mathematical systems require several postulates. Euclid had many, just to define plane geometry. Something as simple as the natural number system (0,1,2,3,...) requires at least 5 (Peano’s Postulates). So we should expect that, if an all-encompassing theory of the universe is based on a single postulate, the postulate is really asserting much more than what may at first appear to be the case.
41 • Brian Bosse • July 10, 2010 • 12:30 AM
Hello Mitch,
You say there is no problem of going from P1 to T2 because Hebrews 6:18 says “it is impossible for God to lie.” You then provide the following argument…
A1: Hebrews 6:18 says “it is impossible for God to lie”
A2: Hebrews 6:18 is part of the Bible (by P4)
A3: Hence, the Bible says “it is impossible for God to lie” (A1+A2)
A4: Therefore, it is true that God cannot lie. (P1+A3).
Allow me to state the argument in a way that Clark envisioned – not that we could not work with your argument – the points I raise will be exactly the same for your argument above. To quote Clark, “From the one axiom it follows syllogistically that such and such a sentence in Scripture is true because it is the Word of God.” Now, we are beginning with a different starting point than “The Bible is the Word of God.” Our starting point is roughly represented by premise 1 below.
Premise 1: All parts of the Bible are true.
Premise 2: “It is impossible for God to lie” is a part of the Bible.
Conclusion: “It is impossible for God to lie” is true.
This type of derivation is exactly what Clark envisioned for his axiomatic system. Now, this argument certainly is valid, but is it sound? For it to be sound, both premises must be true. Premise 1 is considered true simply because it is our axiom. But what about premise 2? How does the Scripturalist know premise 2 is true? How does the Scripturalist really know that “It is impossible for God to lie” is a part of the Bible? Well, there is a lot that goes into this far beyond what we have already granted the Scripturalist. Consider these two things:
(1) He must know that ‘ἐν οἷς ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι [τὸν] θεόν’ is a proposition of the Bible.
(2) He must know that ‘it is impossible for God to lie’ is the correct translation of the Koine Greek text in (1).
Where does all of this knowledge (1) and (2) come from? To complicate matters more there is a textual variant in this text with both readings having fair representation amongst the manuscript evidence. Notice the word that is bracketed. The brackets indicate that some Greek texts omit this word. The word in brackets is the definite article allowing the translator to specify that God is the one being spoken of. Without the brackets one is left with a possible translation along the lines of “it is impossible for a god to lie.” There are scholars who argue that this anarthrous (no article) reading is the original reading. So, the Scriptualist must know which is the correct reading. Not only that, he must know the grammatical and lexical structure of Koine Greek and its nuances. Only then would the Scripturalist be able to begin his translation of the text.
Without mentioning translation theory issues and the fact that there is no such thing as a 1-1 correspondence between languages, the translation put forth by the Scripturalist must be known to be true. So, now we are into palaeography, theories of textual criticism, a theory of history regarding the transmission of the text, and theories of language. This *all* must be established in a manner that is properly called knowledge before the Scripturalist can use premise 2 in his argument.
Mitch, I am not willing to grant all of this to the Scripturalist, and neither would Clark ask me to do so. For, to do so would be tantamount to admitting failure to accomplish what Scripturalism set out to do. Allow me to quote Clark one more time, “Secular philosophy with or without presuppositions has been shown to be a failure. The verbal revelation of the Bible solves the problems of epistemology, history, ethics, and religion. It distinguishes truth from error. It preserves intelligibility. It banishes mysticism, emotionalism, and despair. And by it we receive the Reason of God, that is, God Himself.”
Mitch, perhaps the Scripturalist can succeed? But only by allowing for there to be truth that is properly called knowledge that comes from outside of the one axiom. If they could incorporate this into their system, then who knows? But doing this would be contrary to the very core of Scripturalism.
42 • Mitch Cervinka • July 11, 2010 • 1:55 AM
Hi Brian,
I don’t know whether Clark meant to admit that the proposition “Scripture is the Word of God” implicitly carries with it additional propositions, such as my P2-P5 (as well as others). Personally, I suspect he had a keen mind, and would have seen the necessity of this. Regardless of this, I’m curious whether there is a way to modify his approach a bit in order to address these shortcomings.
Part of my purpose for including P4 & P5 was to circumvent issues such as you have raised.
P4: “The Bible” is a well-defined concept.
P5: The Bible is understandable.
Thus, P4 assumes that we have already established what is and what is not in the canon (including addressing textual issues), and P5 assumes that we possess a hermeneutic that gets at the intended meaning.
Can we not accept these as valid working assumptions, and see where they lead? Can we not accept a set of axioms and see what theorems we can prove from them? That is how mathematics is done.
The only difference, as I see it, is that mathematics does not require that a formal system be realized in the real world. It merely needs to be internally consistent. (Applied mathematics must, of course, model some feature of the real world, but pure mathematics can be purely theoretical.)
A worldview, on the other hand, needs to account for the world as we find it, including the logic, regularity, morality, etc. that all parties inherently assume and employ when they enter the debate. If we find that our axioms are not only self-consistent and self-justifying, but also provide a consistent, comprehensive interpretation of the world around us, then it is of little consequence whether minor textual variants (the presence or absence of an article, for example) exist, so long as the same propositions can be proved from (e.g. other passages of) scripture, regardless which variant is adopted.
Surely, Van Til would argue that scripture teaches something concrete, and that we are morally obligated to believe it. If knowledge is so elusive that genuine, absolute knowledge cannot be gleaned from the Bible, then it seems to me this would be just as devastating to Van Til’s position as to Clark’s, and indeed, to all Christian thinking. Where is the anchor in your understanding of scripture that allows us to say, with Scripture, “Thus says the Lord…”?
43 • Mitch Cervinka • July 11, 2010 • 2:32 AM
It occurs to me that, when we affirm that the Bible is God’s Word, we are speaking of the autographs, and not of the Biblical evidence that has survived to the present day. The original manuscripts, penned by God’s apostles and prophets, are the inspired, inerrant Word of God. Anything else is a copy, possibly containing errors of transmission.
Having admitted this, we are still confident that the God who sent us His inspired Word intends for us to have in our possession all that is needed to recover the essential message of His revelation. Thus, we are confident that the theological content of the Bible has been preserved, even if minor variations in orthography prevent us from getting at the exact wording of the originals. This is confirmed when we examine the various manuscripts, since no variant has been found that materially affects any major doctrine of the Christian faith.
Therefore, to say “The Bible is God’s Word”, we could mean either:
P1a: The Biblical autographs are God’s Word, or
P1b: The univocal theology contained in the surviving Biblical manuscripts is God’s Word.
Of the two, P1b gives us a practical basis for a logical system.
If we adopt P1a instead, then we would need additional postulates affirming our ability to recover the original meaning and content of the autographs.
44 • Mitch Cervinka • July 11, 2010 • 2:34 AM
It seems to me the absence of the article is really not as significant as you suggest, since scripture sometimes omits the article when speaking of God—i.e. the absence of the article does not necessarily intend “a god”. Two examples are found in John 1, for example: once in verse 1 (“the Word was God”), and again in verse 6 (“there was a man sent from God”).
Arians (Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Way International, etc.) try to defend their denial of Christ’s deity by citing the absence of the article in verse 1, but their New World Translation still says “There was a man sent from God” (rather than “... a god”) at verse 6. I know of no translation that renders verse 6 using “a god”. It simply wouldn’t make any sense.
When exegeting a passage, we must never divorce a passage from its Biblical context. In Hebrews 6, the author is discussing “God”, not “any god” (see, for example, vss. 13 & 17, where the presence of the article is not questioned). In this context, he would have no particular reason to say “it is impossible for a god to lie”. He could not, for example, argue from the greater to the lesser, because the one true and living God is not in the same category as these lesser “gods”, and it would therefore not be valid to claim that “God is a god”.
Moreover, in the larger context of scripture, there are no true gods. There are only creatures that are idolatrously worshipped as gods. Idols of wood and stone cannot lie for the simple reason that they have no moral or rational faculties, and can neither think nor speak. Human idols, such as the Pharoahs or the Caesars surely could and did lie, and the writer of Hebrews would not have been ignorant of this fact.
I am not suggesting we should close our eyes to such considerations when formulating our starting axioms. Naturally, we need to be diligent to do textual criticism, exegesis, etc. in the best way we know how.
45 • Brian Bosse • July 11, 2010 • 6:59 PM
Hello Mitch,
I am essentially not going to say anything new. As such, I do not think further discussion will be fruitful. So, I suggest we wrap this up. Here are my last thoughts, and you may have the last word, if you want.
Scripturalism is posited by Clark to solve epistemological issues (and other issues as well). He does this by saying, that all knowledge is that which is derived from the one axiom. *Nothing* else is knowledge. That is to say, knowledge is revelation dependent. But in order for you and I to learn what this revelation is and deduce anything from it, it is necessarily the case that we *already* know certain things that did not come from the revelation. It is foundational to understanding the revelation.
Regarding this, you say that we should grant P4 that not only includes a definite canon, but also includes a definite text. Not only that, you say we should grant P5 that allows us to have a proper hermeneutic to understand the text. But more than that, the understanding is univocal. Now, what you are asking to be taken for granted are not simply two postulates. These postulates assume massive amounts of knowledge in many large fields that are proper objects of investigation for the philosopher. This is the point I made in my last post. This kind of knowledge is precisely what the philosopher is trying to account for, and is what Clark is trying to account for. If you say, “Naw, we do not need to account for it,” then you have abrogated the philosophical system’s responsibilities.
You mention that accepting postulates like P4 and P5 is how mathematics is done. I think this is not quite right. Take a formal systems that model something, like Peano’s Arithmetic. This system uses axioms that are basic, i.e., foundational. From there, the theorems derived are truths of arithmetic. Your P4 and P5, as clarified above would be equivalent to a mathematician positing the following as an axiom of his formal system, “Take as an axiom the prime number theorem and everything it assumes.” Hilbert would have rolled over in his grave. As such, accepting postulates like P4 and P5 above is *not* what mathematicians do.
Now, you go onto to talk about a univocal theology and original autographs. How do we know what is the text of the original autograph? Also, what is this univocal theology, and how do we know? You mentioned that you did not think the textual variant in Heb. 6:18 was a big deal because, “the absence of the article does not necessarily intend ‘a god’.” You missed my point. The fact that we do not know with any kind of deductive certainty what the translation is undermines the Scripturalist – even if we can be fairly certain what it says. You speak of proper exegesis. Exegeting a text is *not* a deductive exercise. As such, according to Scripturalism, our exegetical conclusions cannot be knowledge. No respected philosophical system would ask me to grant all of this to them. These systems are supposed to solve these kinds of problems, not ignore them.
Lastly, you asked the following question, “Where is the anchor in your understanding of Scripture that allows us to say, with Scripture, ‘Thus says the Lord…’?” If by an anchor you are requiring philosophical certainty, then there is none. Only God has philosophical certainty. However, if one allows for someone to have genuine knowledge apart from philosophical certainty, then there is an anchor. For example, I can say with a very high amount of confidence that my birthday is on September 28th. In fact, I am morally responsible for this belief in that if I were to purposefully put down a different date on some government document, I would be guilty of lying. However, I do not know with philosophical certainty that September 28th is my birthday. I merely have strong rational justification, but, nevertheless, it is logically possible I am wrong. It is logically possible that the doctor mistakenly or purposefully recorded the wrong date on my birth certificate; it is logically possible that my parents remembered incorrectly or that they have deceived me all of these years; etc… Because of this logical possibility I cannot say that I know this with philosophical certainty, but yet I am still morally responsible for this belief. Therefore, I am morally responsible for knowledge that is not philosophically certain. Therefore, I can have knowledge of the Scriptures that I can say with conviction is “Thus saith the Lord,” be accountable to it, and yet my knowledge not be philosophically certain.
I have enjoyed the discussion, and wish you the best.
Warm Regards,
Brian
46 • Mitch Cervinka • July 11, 2010 • 11:19 PM
Thanks Brian.
I see your point. Thank you for your help!!
By the way, I just came across an article by Michael Butler that answers your original thesis (i.e. that TAG must take down competing worldviews one at a time).
[http://butler-harris.org/tag/]
He counters (citing Forster) by saying that it is not necessary to refute all competing views. It is only necessary to refute the negation of the Christian worldview.
“... Simply put, all non-Christian systems presuppose that experience can be accounted for on autonomous lines. The non-Christian worldviews share the common feature that experience can be made sense of independently of God and his revelatory word. ...”
He cites Van Til “We have constantly sought to bring out that all forms of antitheistic thinking can be reduced to one.”
(These quotes are from page 21 of his 25-page essay).
The article discusses and answers other objections to TAG as well. I was curious if you were familiar with Butler’s article and the arguments he makes in defense of TAG?
47 • Brian Bosse • July 12, 2010 • 12:22 AM
Hello Mitch,
Yes, I am familiar with Butler’s defenses for TAG, but I have not read this particular paper. Even though my paper only interacted with Bahnsen, in it I explicitly dealt with the claim that “...all non-Christian worldviews share the common feature that experience can be made sense of independently of God and his revelatory word…” It begins at the beginning of page 13 of my paper and goes through page 16. In the end, the claim is never established in a deductively certain manner, and they never do establish the further *necessary* claim that “all worldviews that try to make sense of experience independently of God and His revelatory word fail.” You can see that this further claim needs to be established to establish Christianity as necessary.
Here is the concluding paragraph of page 16 of my paper - you will note that it is dealing directly with what Butler said above…
“This brings to light an even stronger objection in the same vein. If there were an objectively certain proof, then there would be no reason for the apologist to take down multiple worldviews in an apologetic encounter. There would be no reason to even know what the worldview of the unbeliever was. There would be no reason to present an indirect argument in the Van Tillian sense. All the apologist would need to do is present his proof that all non-Christian worldviews are always autonomous, and that autonomy always leads to irrationality. No more could be said. If the unbeliever wants to be rational, then he would be forced to accept (1). Thus, the actual practice of the apologist militates against his claim of having an objectively certain proof.”
Note: (1) above was along the lines of “Christianity is necessary for knowledge.”
Between TAG and Scripturalism, TAG is a better argument in my opinion. But the strong modal claim made by Van Til, Bahnsen and Butler (as quoted above) fails to deliver. They are after the chimera of philosophical certainty; so, they defend the strong modal form. Too bad, really.
Sincerely,
Brian
48 • Mitch Cervinka • July 12, 2010 • 1:07 PM
Thanks for your time and insights, Brian!